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On 1 July 1939 a very curious poem appeared in the pages of the Fiji Times, 
arguably the most loyal newspaper in the most loyal, dutiful colony in the 
British Empire. Titled "To Whom It May Concern, II it went like this: 
Please be kind to Britain, 
She isn't very strong, 
Her Navy is inefficient, 
Her Army's all gone wrong. 
Her ARP • is useless, 
Her Airforce is far too small, 
Her people so degenerate, 
She has no morale at all! 
She doesn't want to fight you, 
She's so convinced you'd win, 
She'lltet you take her Empire, 
If it will save her skin. 
She's old, decayed and senile, 
And you have strength and youth, 
So please be kind to Britain, 
Don't keep abusing Britain, 
Be nice to poor old Britain, 
Or, you may learn the truth. 
The truth about Great Britain was quite simple. It emerged from the war 
a devastated nation, diminished in international stature. Its once mighty, far-
flung empire began to crumble and creak around it. Soon, with India leading 
the way, the sun would set forever on waves that Britannia had ruled for well 
over a century. But the truth about the Pacific War in Fiji is not quite so 
• ARP: air raid precaution 
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simple. Except for a few brief months during the entire period of the Pacific 
War, Fiji was never in danger of invasion from any quarter. Not a single shot 
was fired, not a single life lost on Fijian soil itself for the defense of those 
islands. And yet the war became .. ~ powerful symbolic event in Fijian history, 
bequeathing a legacy of suspicion, division, distrust, and hostil ity among the 
different communities in Fiji. 
The Fiji war in its various aspects is too large a topic for me to cover in 
this paper so I'll be brief and confine myself to one or possibly two related 
questions. I The first is: How did the different ethnic groups in Fiji, the Fijians, 
the Indians, artd the Europeans, respond to the government-inspired war 
effort, and how did they perceive the war, it's importance and significance for 
their own communities and for the colony as a whole? Let us take the 
indigenous Fijian response first. Their response was quick, warm, and 
extremely generous. In 1943, .the peak period, there were 8513 men in 
uniform in Fiji, half of whom were in the labor corps. Of these 6371 were 
indigenous Fijians. Local and expatriate Europeans, particularly from New 
Zealand, contributed 1870, and Indians numbered a paltry 264. The Fijians 
justifiably emerged from the war as heroes, praised for their bravery and 
cunning in jungle warfare, their steadiness under fire, and their loyalty and 
dedication to the cause of the British Empire. Their record of 
accomplishment, as measured by the number of awards they won, is 
impressive. Altogether they received 29 decorations, including a posthumous 
Victoria Cross, and 25 mentions in dispatches. 
The question is: Why did the Fijian community respond so 
enthusiastically? It seems to me that there are at least four or five reasons 
which help us understand the quick Fijian response. First, culture had a role 
to play. Fijians were no strangers to war, which was a constant and important 
part of their life in precolonial times. Fighting was, as Charles Wilks described 
in the 1840s, "a noble employment of man and a path to honor and status for 
young men" (Ravuvu 1974, 1). This was also the case in many other Pacific 
Island societies. Courage and valor, prowess in war--these were values upon 
which Fijian culture placed a very high premium. Another important reason 
for the prompt Fijian response, I think, was the fact that the people who did 
the recruiting were high chiefs, in some cases paramount chiefs. Ratu Sir Lala 
Sukuna, only a couple of rungs below God in most Fijian eyes according to his 
biographer Deryck Scarr (1980), led the recruiting effort. He was Oxford 
educated, a member of the bar, and a distinguished high chief in the employ 
of the colonial civil service. He toured the villages, talked and advised, and 
enlisted young men with great success. Several other very high Fijian chiefs 
enlisted as officers in various platoons, and their presence was inspiring to 
young men willing to prove their loyalty to the Crown. "Fijians will never be 
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recognized unless our blood is shed first, " said Suiruna, to great effect. And 
coming from him, these words carried great weight. So, at one level, the active 
enlisting was seen as fulfilling a traditional obligation to the turaga 'chief, and 
to the vanua 'land' (see Ravuvu 1974). The principle of reciprocity was clearly 
at work here. 
Whatever we may think of the effects of colonialism in the Pacific or Fiji, 
most Fijian chiefs did not actively dislike the British or their policies. They 
saw the coming of the British to Fiji in a positive light. Gordon's policy of 
indirect rule had preserved Fijian traditions, institutions, and values, albeit in 
a significantly modified form (see France 1969). The Great Council of Chiefs 
was the body that was directly responsible for much of the government of 
indigenous Fijian society. The colonial government had acted to prevent la..nd 
alienation with a result that 83 percent of all land in Fiji today remains in 
Fijian hands. The Fijian chiefs saw the government of Fiji not as a one-way 
street but as a partnership involving themselves and the colonial government. 
And in things that mattered to them, the welfare of their own society, they 
had complete controL Given this situation it is not surprising to find that 
when one partner was under attack, the other felt obliged to come to its 
assistance. There were of course throughout Fijian history many Fijian voices 
of dissent. In the early part of this century there was Apolosi Nawai, and in 
the 1920s Fijians in southern Viti Levu youth organizations, such as the Viti 
Cauravou, at times advocated refusal to pay tax because they complained of 
neglect and isolation, of being treated like children. But they were suppressed 
by the combined power of chiefs and colonial officialdom. 
For the most part, though, trust characterized the relationship between 
chiefs and the government. Ratu Sukuna, the first Fijian to be knighted, had a 
certain undoubted love for British culture and British institutions. Opposing 
an Indian push for complete adult franchise in 1934, he said in the Legislative 
Council: "Fijians desire a form of government in which British culture, a sense 
of fair play and justice are going to preponderate. That, sir, " he said to the 
speaker, "is a desire we hold very strongly" (Scarr 1980). A year before, in 
1933, opposing Indian calls for political equality with Europeans, Sukuna had 
said in the Legislative Council: "The question of equality has been raised and 
I should like to say publicly that so far as the Fijians are concerned, we think 
we are very well treated, and for the next two, three, four generations we will 
look to European leadership and expect the Europeans to lead us until such 
times as we are able to guide ourselves" (Scarr 1980). Similar sentiments were 
expressed in 1961, 1965, 1969, and indeed today, right now as I speak, the 
paramount chiefs of Fiji are beseeching the Queen to keep the title of Tui 
Viti, despite unceremoniously severing links with the Crown. The fact was 
that many chiefs were educated in Britain; "going up" to Oxford, even for a 
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minor administrative course for a couple of months, was a source of great 
prestige and status in a community and colony that placed high premium on 
rituals, ceremonies, and protocol. And the fact that they shared the same 
religion and played "rugger" and cricket together helped to reinforce bonds 
of solidarity between the Fijians and the Europeans. So it was only natural for 
chiefs to come to the assistance of their mentors and protectors in a time of 
need. 
But while sentiment played apart in determining the quality and 
magnitude of Fijian response, political calculations were not far below the 
surface. These were clearly understood if not always publicly articulated. 
~ehapges ,that ,displeased Fijia!i chiefs were in the offing. Indians demanded 
. .', - ' 
full democracy, elected government, and equality with Europeans. And as we 
might guess, these were things that chiefs opposed because such things as 
democracy and elections posed direct and very real threats to their status and 
the basis of their power. Then there were the demands from the Colonial 
Sugar Refining Company (CSR), the monopoly sugar company in Fiji, which 
could not be ignored. The company led an attempt in the 1930s to get the 
Fijian landlords to open up land and to give more secure leases to Indian 
tenants. And that, too, threatened the Fijian hold on power. Ratu Sukuna saw 
very clearly indeed that if he was going to stop the tide of change threatening 
to undermine Fijian chiefly power (as he saw it), he needed to get the British 
government on his side. A strong show of loyalty would do the trick, and the 
war provided that opportunity. He was not disappointed. Changes after the 
war gave an expanded role for Fijian chiefs in a revitalized Fijian 
administration. It was reformed and revitalized in 1946. The government 
reaffirmed its pledge to uphold the promises of the Deed of Cession to 
maintain the paramountcy of Fijian interests in Fiji. The chiefs, thus, were 
able to kill two birds with one stone. They got what they wanted and, on the 
other hand, demonstrated their loyalty to the empire. 
The Indian response, in contrast, was, as I have said, paltry and indirect. 
They raised money through carnivals, games, and direct contributions--
enough, surprisingly, to buy a bomber, which was ,named the Fiji Indian, for 
the Royal Air Force. Some who couldn't put up with petty acts of racial 
discrimination in Fiji went to New Zealand and joined the Narrow Neck and 
Maori camps. Others with some European blood joined the part-European 
platoon in Fiji. Hundreds joined the Labour Corps and served in Fiji for the 
entire duration of the war. But as far as actual soldiering went, their response 
was unenthusiastic. They were labeled disloyal and seditious, and their 
descendants have been tainted with the supposed cowardly sins of their 
fathers and forefathers. 
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Why this paltry response? Were Indians actually actively disloyal? Let us 
consider several things. In the first place, what is not often realized is that the 
government did not want Indians to enroll as soldiers in the armed forces. An 
Indian platoon was created in 1934 but disbanded in 1941. Instead, the 
government wanted Indians as laborers and as workers. That was the way, the 
governor told the Indians, that they could make their valuable contributions 
to the war effort. Listen to the governor in a radio broadcast in 1941. He 
urged the Indians "To remember always that the best way to win a war is in 
the first place to increase the general level of production by working with 
increased effort in whatever may be the normal employment. And in the 
second, to fit themselves with any special responsibility for which they may be 
selected." The second part was a haIf-hearted afterdlought. No serious and 
sustained effort was ever made to recruit Indians to fight in the Fiji Defence 
Forces. 
The second reason for Indian reluctance was European insistence on 
maintaining double standards in the matter of pay. European soldiers 
received 3 shillings a day, wife separation allowance of 3 shillings per week, 
and child allowance of 1 shilling and 6 pence. Non-European soldiers 
received 2 shillings per day, half the European rate of wife separation 
allowance, and one-third the child allowance. The Indians simply, and quite 
understandably, insisted on equal pay, equal work, equal value, equal risk. 
The government refused. It refused because it knew that Fiji was never really 
under any imminent threat of attack. And Indians refused to concede that, on 
the battlefield, a white soldier's life was worth more than a non-white soldier's 
life. Today no one would seriously question the principle of equal pay for 
equal work. But in colonial Fiji it was seditious to even think of equality with 
Europeans. 
The third reason for the Indians' lukewarm response was that unlike the 
Fijians, the Indians did not have a warm recollection of their colonial 
experience in Fiji. Whereas the Fijians remembered protection and various 
safeguards, Indians remembered servitude, cultural deracination, violence, 
and an unaided, lonely struggle for survival after the end of indenture in 1920. 
The colonial government was rightly perceived as uncaring, unsympathetic, 
and working in collusion with the CSR. Indeed, in every dispute that farmers 
had with the company from the 1920s to the 1960s, the government always 
sided with the company, using on all occasions strong tactics to break up 
industrial strikes. The company was also a major landholder in Fiji. Those 
tenants who lived on its estates were bound by a contract that minutely 
regulated every aspect of the tenant's life. You couldn't even plant vegetables 
for your own use on CSR estate land without the company's permission. You 
couldn't keep a milk cow, a goat, poultry, or anything else without the 
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co.mpany's autho.rizatio.n. And CSR made it very clear that it didn't want 
Indians to enlist fo.r o.verseas s~rvice because that wo.uld mean lo.ss o.f income 
and lo.SS of labor fo.r its o.wn o.per<itio.n. Thus, when the time came fo.r Indians 
tpdecide who. to. listell to., they knew what to do.. They called the CSR a 
tyrannical mother-in-law andlbe go.vernment a dutiful daughter-in-law . I've 
seen no. record anywhere o.f the go.vernment ever leaning on the CSR to make 
it less painful fo.r its tenants tp leave for service in the Labour Co.rps or o.n the 
b<ittlefield. 
Membership in the British Empire was not the badge of hono.r for the 
In4ians that it obviously.was for the Europeans and Fijian chiefs. As o.ne 
official no.ted, the po.ssibility of th~ decline of the British Empire aroused in 
the Indian "no· emotion stro.nger than incredulity that the British should have 
allowed themselves to. be reduce<;l to this humiliating plight." He continued: 
"To the Indians we live among here, the Empire is no national heritage, no 
pro.ud monument tp the distinguished history o.f their race. It is something 
~xtraneous to. their culture and they could face with equanimity the prospect 
of it being shaken to pieCes by the· convulsions o.f this war." 
Two other things need to be m~ntioned. One is that the Indians did not 
sllare the dark view that the British painted of Japanese as monstrous human 
beings who.se brutality knew no. bounds. They listened to Radio Azad, 
bro.adcast from Tokyo at the crack o.f dawn every day, and heard Japan talk 
~bout a new c;>rder, freedom for the Asiatic races, and the end of British 
colonialism in 'Asia and the Pacific. The colo.nial government, of course, 
scoffed at these promises, but one Indian asked, "How can we know it is false 
when we haven't even given it a try? After all, there might be something in 
itl" When one prominent Fiji Indian leader was asked how he might respond 
if the Japanese came, he said: "Well, now that you (the Japanese) have come 
to live among us, yo.U must do. your very best for Dur sDcial welfare." The 
British thDught that seditious. 
The secon4 thing that ShDUld be borne in mind is tftat for many Indians at 
that time (1930s and 19408) India was still the emotional and spiritual 
hDmeland. Emerging frDm the shadows Df indenture they were trying to forge 
an identity for themselves in this periDd. Naturally, inevitably, they turned to 
India. It is only to. be expected that Indian political thought and pDlitical 
developments in this period would influence the attitude of people in Fiji. If 
the colonial gDvernment in Fiji had been more caring and mDre sympathetic 
to. the needs Df Indian farmers and workers, the Indians might have been less 
inclined to. IDDk fDr help outside the colony. But that was not the case. For all 
thes~ reasons then-culture, history, sentiment, and ideoIDgy--the Indian 
respo.nse remained lukewarm. Fiji Indians were not actively dislDyal Dr 
seditious; Fijicm exuberance Dnly made it seem so. 
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What about Europeans? Well, it was their war and, as was to be expected, 
they rallied behind the war effort with total dedication. They knew that 
without the British Empire, they would be reduced to nothing, without the 
jobs and status they enjoyed in the colony. Men joined the different regiments 
and went abroad, and women formed such societies as the Patriotic Knitting 
and Sewing Society to talk about the war and raise money. They put up with 
the inconvenience of rations, curfews, and other restrictions. But as they 
listened to Australian radio and heard terrible news about heavy casualties, 
especially among colonial regiments from Australia and New Zealand, anti-
English sentiment began to emerge slowly among the local Europeans. One 
example: "John Bull is sitting tight and secure in his little island, accepting 
heroic sacrifices in blood and treasure from his children overseas but 
unwilling to take any risks on tt':leir behalf in return. " They accused ;'the 
British lion of deserting its cubs and leaving them to be devoured by the 
Japanese tiger. " 
But it was the Americans, who came in large numbers, who caught the full 
brunt of Australasian andlocal European bitterness and frustration. One 
reason was the circulation of wild rumors. Noted one official, "The periodic 
flare-up of anti-American sentiment among Kiwi troops appears to have its 
origins in an emotional reaction to stories about American soldiers in New 
Zealand. Tales of desertion of wives and sweethearts for Americans do 
circulate freely and each man feels his girl is being stolen or seduced." And 
the Americans did not make it easy for themselves either. For example, they 
did not comport themselves to the prescribed norms of Anglo-Australasian 
social behavior in Fiji. They drank heavily in public, they womanized, talked 
freely, and generally "had a good time. " 
The Americans posed another kind of threat to the established order as 
well. In their dealings with non-Europeans they were often generous, open, 
and congenial, which was quite a contrast to the ritualized and closely 
regulated conduct between local Europeans and non-whites. For example, 
Americans didn't mind too much if Indian drivers went into the camps and 
walked or drove away with a few gallons of petrol for their trucks. And they 
didn't mind paying a few shillings to Fijians for horses stolen from the Sabeto 
Indian settlement. They shared their cigarettes and on occasion their whisky 
in return for a few favors. The colonial government called Americans 
"Strangers with novel viewpoints and unfamiliar ways causing a silent but far 
from painless upheaval in the lives of all the communities." It feared that 
American friendliness toward the local population might put the government 
into a "thoroughly uncomfortable fire. " 
But that was not to be. The Americans left, leaving behind memories of a 
different kind of sahib: efficient, impatient with rituals, and generous. And it 
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didn't take too long for old colonial ways of doing things to reassert 
themselves. Still, in many ways Fiji of 1945 was very different from Fiji of 
1939. Demobilized Fijian men went back to the villages. many broken by all 
kinds of diseases, such as tuberculosis, malaria, and smallpox. They went with 
strange and wonderful stories. One of my favorites is recounted by Asesela 
Ravuvu in his book Fijians at War. It is about Fijian soldiers not wanting to 
train when they had a hangover. or when it was wet and miserable outside. 
They would eat hot chillies, raise their body temperature, sweat, and then tell 
the doctors, "Look, I have a fever. I can't go out today. II Ravuvu also tells the 
story about the valiant Viliame Lomasalate of Platoon No.5 who, prevented 
from keeping his promise to eat the first enemy he killed in the Solomons, 
nevertheless managed to eat the eyeballs of a dead Japanese soldier which he 
had scooped out with his pocket knife. Such fierce patriotism . and loyalty to 
the cause of the war earned for the Fijian soldiers a glorious reputation as 
among the best jungle fighters in the world. 
At the end of the war the colonial government gave about five thousand 
sets of agricultural equipment to the demobilized Fijian soldiers to take back 
to their villages to replant their neglected gardens and reinvigorate the 
subsistence economy. A money economy entered the village after the war, 
and in the Fijian villages on the periphery of towns tinned goods (fish. 
mutton) began to replace some of the traditional items of exchange. Before 
the war European and Fijian leaders had, in their own ways, opposed Indian 
demands for political change and social equality. Their experiences during the 
war--the camaraderie of the battlefield and their common dedication to the 
cause of the empire--augmented their shared hostility toward Indians and 
forged a bond of friendship. which has endured ever since, between the two 
groups. The war also transformed the character and the role of the Fijian 
military: the Fiji Defence Forces, created solely for the defense of Fiji itself, 
were given a new role as the Fiji military forces, which could be sent out to 
any part of the British Empire needing soldiers. By design as well as default, 
then, the Fiji military force was necessarily Fijian dominated. An accident of 
history had given the Fijians a power more important, as we now know, than 
the ballot box. They jealously guarded the Fijian domination of the armed 
forces with what results I need not say. The truth about the Pacific War in 
Fiji, then, is not simple. 
Note 
1 This paper is an edited transcription of my talk given at the 1988 conference. A fully 
documented study is in preparation. 
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